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UID:20260626T022958EDT-80348hoBuN@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260626T062958Z
DESCRIPTION:\n	\n		Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n		Speaker: Michael 
 Kopel – University of Graz\, Austria\n\n		Webinar link\n			Webinar ID: 841 3695
  9888\n			Passcode: 120834\n\n		We study a manufacturer's encroachment choice w
 hen the retailer's decision to acquire and analyze demand information is c
 ostly. Notably\, we explicitly take into account that the manufacturer mig
 ht set such a high wholesale price that the retailer shuts down the indire
 ct channel if demand turns out to be low. As a result\, the retailer might
  opt to stay strategically ignorant about market information (even if it i
 s free). We show that the retailer's optimal information acquisition strat
 egy is non-monotonic in the expected market potential. Moreover\, staying 
 deliberately uniformed deters sufficiently inefficient manufacturers from 
 opening up a direct channel which can be beneficial for the supply chain. 
 We also consider the retailer's incentive to share information and find th
 at if the market potential is sufficiently large\, the retailer might pref
 er to share information with the manufacturer and - anticipating this - th
 e latter does not encroach. In this sense\, the retailer's information str
 ategy is used as an anti-encroachment device. Information sharing can bene
 fit the supply chain only if the manufacturer does not encroach.\n\n		(with 
 Peter Habiger)\n	\n\n
DTSTART:20220317T150000Z
DTEND:20220317T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Information Acquisition\, Strategic Ignorance\, and Manufacturer En
 croachment
URL:/cim/channels/event/information-acquisition-strate
 gic-ignorance-and-manufacturer-encroachment-338484
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