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UID:20260619T212836EDT-5522fKxvWO@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260620T012836Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\nSpeaker: Julia de Fru
 tos Cachorro – Universitat de Barcelona\, Spain \n\n\n\nAbstract: We study
  a problem of exploitation of a groundwater resource\, mainly used for irr
 igation\, in which a water agency is needed to manage an exceptional and p
 riority extraction of water for an alternative/new use. To this goal\, we 
 build a two-stage discrete Stackelberg game in which the leader (the water
  agency) just intervenes when the new use takes place (in the second stage
 ) and the follower is a representative agent of the regular users of the a
 quifer. We study two types of Stackelberg equilibrium\, namely open-loop (
 commitment) equilibrium and feedback (non-commitment) equilibrium. Theoret
 ical results show that commitment strategies lead to higher stock levels t
 han non-commitment strategies. However\, performing numerical simulations 
 relaxing previous economic assumptions\, we show that there are situations
  in which non-commitment strategies could be more favorable than commitmen
 t strategies not only in terms of final stock of the resource but also in 
 terms of regular users' profits.\n\n(with Guiomar Martín-Herrán and Mabel 
 Tidball)\n
DTSTART:20230302T160000Z
DTEND:20230302T170000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Stackelberg Competition in Groundwater Resources with Multiple Uses
URL:/cim/channels/event/stackelberg-competition-ground
 water-resources-multiple-uses-351768
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