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UID:20260621T231638EDT-8416jW93z8@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260622T031638Z
DESCRIPTION:\n	\n		GERAD seminar\n\n		Speaker: Dena Firoozi – Assistant Professo
 r\, Department of Decision Sciences\, HEC Montréal\, Canada\n\n		\n\n		Abstrac
 t: Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on t
 he optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent\, with the former contrac
 ting work from the latter\, in return for providing a monetary award. Whil
 e this field canonically considers a single agent\, the situation where mu
 ltiple agents\, or even an infinite amount of agents are contracted by a p
 rincipal are growing in prominence and pose interesting and realistic prob
 lems. Here\, agents form a Nash equilibrium among themselves\, and a Stack
 elberg equilibrium between themselves as a collective and the principal. W
 e apply this framework to the problem of implementing Renewable Energy Cer
 tificate (REC) markets\, where the principal requires regulated firms (pow
 er generators) to pay a noncompliance penalty which is inversely proportio
 nal to the amount of RECs they have. RECs can be obtained by generating el
 ectricity from clean sources or purchasing on the market. The agents react
  to this penalty and optimize their behaviours to navigate the system at m
 inimum cost. In the agents' model we incorporate market clearing as well a
 s agent heterogeneity. For a given market design\, we find the Nash equili
 brium among agents using techniques from mean field games. We then use tec
 hniques from extended McKean-Vlasov control problems to solve the principa
 l (regulators) problem\, who aim to choose the penalty function in such a 
 way that balances environmental and revenue impacts optimally. We find thr
 ough these techniques that the optimal penalty function is linear in the a
 gents' terminal RECs.\n\n		Joint work with Arvind Shrivats and Sebastian Jai
 mungal.\n	\n\n
DTSTART:20221006T150000Z
DTEND:20221006T150000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Optimal Design of Renewable Energy Certificate markets: A Principal
 -Agent Mean Field Game Approach
URL:/cim/channels/event/optimal-design-renewable-energ
 y-certificate-markets-principal-agent-mean-field-game-approach-351858
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