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UID:20260621T034222EDT-2852xwcReB@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260621T074222Z
DESCRIPTION:\n	\n		\n			Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n			Speaker: Bertra
 nd Crettez – Université Panthéon-Assas\, Paris II\, France\n\n			\n\n			Abstract
 : This paper studies supply chain competition and vertical coordination in
  a differential linear-quadratic game setting. In this setting\, supply ch
 ains produce complement goods (in the sense of Cournot: that is\, consumer
 s need one unit of both products provided by the supply chains). Each supp
 ly chain is made up of a single supplier or manufacturer and a single sell
 er or retailer who coordinate their decisions through a revenue-sharing co
 ntract and who play a Stackelberg game where the supplier is the leader an
 d the retailer is the follower. Competition occurs at both levels of the s
 upply chain. Retailers play Nash and compete in price\; manufacturers also
  play Nash but they compete in choosing their production capacities. We co
 nsider both cases where investments are reversible and irreversible. Manuf
 acturers provide any level of production required by the retailers (up to 
 their production capacity). Moreover\, as leader of a Stackelberg game in 
 their respective supply chain\, both manufacturers exploit the equilibrium
  price decisions made by the retailers. In keeping with the literature on 
 dynamic competition between supply chains\, we focus on the case where man
 ufacturers rely on open-loop strategies. We show that when investment is r
 eversible there are no equilibria. Where investment is irreversible\, equi
 libria exist only when the production capacities of the manufacturers are 
 equal--- in that case it turns out that all strategies are time consistent
 . The non-existence of equilibrium stems from the fact that manufacturers'
  instant profits are discontinuous functions of their production capacitie
 s.\n		\n	\n\n
DTSTART:20221124T160000Z
DTEND:20221124T170000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Dynamic Supply Chain Game with
  Vertical Coordination\, Horizontal Competition and Cournot Complementary 
 Goods
URL:/cim/channels/event/existence-equilibrium-dynamic-
 supply-chain-game-vertical-coordination-horizontal-competition-and-351871
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