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UID:20260624T202354EDT-5621A9AZGU@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260625T002354Z
DESCRIPTION:\n	Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n	 \n\n	Speaker: Flori
 an Wagener – University of Amsterdam\, Netherland\n\n\n \n\nSeminar link\n
 \nMeeting ID: 962 7774 9870\n\nPasscode: 285404\n\n \n\nAbstract:\n\n \n\n
 We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash
  equilibria (MPE) in a class of differential games of public good investme
 nt\, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provi
 de a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the set of MP
 E is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies\, unique in our
  context\, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. We extend the the
 ory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strateg
 ies. Our methods work under general functional forms.\n
DTSTART:20210114T160000Z
DTEND:20210114T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods
URL:/cim/channels/event/all-symmetric-equilibria-diffe
 rential-games-public-goods-327690
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