I. Introduction
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Tensions among neighbouring countries are inevitable, especially in relation to territorial integrity, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty. Aviation, whose very function is to connect territories across borders, is often entangled in such political tensions. One of the recurring notions is with regard to control over the Flight Information Region (FIR). Turkey, for example, has disputed aspects of the for decades with Greece and refused to acknowledge the controlled by Cyprus. Through years of diplomatic means, Indonesia finally took over the portion of the Singapore FIR in 2022. Most recently in 2025, Somalia faced a different challenge as , a self-declared entity, has issued unauthorized communications claiming authority over the Mogadishu FIR.
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But why does a FIR become so important in the context of conflict? If we take a closer look at the foregoing examples, States often invoke rhetoric of 鈥渟overeignty,鈥� 鈥渘ational dignity,鈥� national integrity and other expressions carrying similar nationalist nuance when asserting control over FIRs. But is it really the case? Does controlling a FIR grant national dignity or airspace sovereignty to States? Is the goal of FIR to provide national integrity for the nations in charge of FIRs?
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This commentary proposes that the tension around FIR arises because FIR has been used as a tool to emphasise authority, prestige, or territorial completeness, instead of being presented as a technical mandate for navigation safety, which it is. This political narrative causes the public, and sometimes even policymakers, to begin to assume that FIR control is somehow a component of sovereignty. Yet in the operations of international civil aviation, FIR is not, and was never intended to be, a sovereignty-granting mechanism. FIRs exist for a single purpose: to ensure the safe, orderly, and efficient flow of air traffic. When political considerations blur this purpose, aviation safety concerns begin to emerge, and international aviation is placed at risk, constituting a direct violation of the Chicago Convention.
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II. What Exactly is FIR: The Legal and Functional Nature
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A clear distinction between different uses of airspace under international law must first be established. Territorial airspace, as defined under Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, reflects the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over the airspace above its territory. Within this sovereign airspace, States exercise jurisdiction, for example, through the application of their own laws and regulations. By contrast, airspace over the high seas is not subject to the sovereignty of any State and is governed by international rules established under the Chicago Convention, particularly Article 12, which ensures uniformity of air navigation.
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In practice, however, States have developed additional mechanisms to regulate and monitor airspace beyond their territory. One such mechanism is the (ADIZ), which typically extends over areas such as the Exclusive Economic Zone or the high seas and is used to identify aircraft approaching or intending to enter national airspace. ADIZs are established and applied unilaterally by States. This differs fundamentally from FIR, which operates as a cooperative safety-based mechanism coordinated through ICAO for the provision of air traffic services, rather than a mechanism of sovereignty or security control.
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Under the air traffic management framework of international civil aviation, FIR is devised by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) solely for the provision of . States are mandated to provide flight information services to facilitate the safe, orderly, and efficient movement of aircraft continuously and seamlessly across jurisdictions and, importantly, across areas which do not fall under the territory of any state, like the high seas. It is a mechanism created through international coordination to determine which air navigation service provider is capable and responsible for managing specific portions of airspace, so as to improve safety and efficiency by maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.
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Unlike territorial airspace, which is undisputably tied to a State鈥檚 sovereignty, the delineation of FIR control may, and often does, extend over the airspace of another State, or, as mentioned earlier, even cover international airspace above the high seas. The idea is to ensure that all parts of the globe receive air traffic services. The key criterion for FIR assignment by ICAO is not political, but technical capability as to which State or entity is best positioned to provide adequate, safe and continuous air traffic services. process was coordinated by ICAO, where contracting States agree on the allocation of airspace responsibilities. While ICAO facilitates and formalises these arrangements, the alignment itself is based on agreement between States.
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In the early decades of civil aviation, the alignment considered the coordination of air navigation services across broad geographic areas, bearing in mind that many countries were incapable of providing this service during the post-war period because of their technology and human resource capabilities. In this context, was divided with FIR alignment on the basis of technical and operational considerations to provide contiguous flight information and alerting services. This means that FIR alignment does not rely on cultural identity, geopolitical strength, or territorial entitlement. For example, covers the airspace of both Belgium and Luxembourg, and the covers the airspace over the territory of Monaco. In oceanic airspace such as airspace over the Atlantic, FIRs are coordinated by ICAO through to , such as the UK, Ireland, Canada, the US, Iceland, Portugal and Norway, to provide air traffic services over international waters where no State exercises sovereignty.
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FIR, therefore, is not an assignment of mandate that is analogous to a grant of territory, thereby establishing a territorial claim for nations. Nor does its designation have consequences of extending a State鈥檚 sovereignty beyond its territorial borders. The assignment does extend the State鈥檚 level of technical control. As a result, FIR and air navigation services鈥� responsibility can be, and frequently are, assigned or delegated between States. The ICAO encourages States to allocate FIRs based on the ability to meet international safety standards, even when that means assigning responsibility to a neighbouring State in the spirit of ensuring safe and economical international civil aviation pursuant to the Preamble of the Chicago Convention. Sovereignty under Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, on the other hand, cannot be delegated and, especially, cannot be granted or assigned by ICAO.
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III. Confusing FIR Responsibility with Sovereignty
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The theoretical and practical underpinnings of the need and operations of FIRs, plus the principles governing FIRs, therefore, are clear that: FIR alignment is merely based on operational efficiency and safety, not political or territorial entitlement. In practice, however, FIR control intersects with national security and geopolitics, particularly because FIR procedures may affect the flight coordination of military and state aircraft. As a result, FIR management is often perceived and confused as carrying implications that go beyond its technical function, leaving it vulnerable to sovereign or strategic interpretation.
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The long鈥憇tanding demonstrates this tension clearly. Turkey alleges that Greece 鈥溾�� its FIR responsibilities by treating Athens FIR as implying sovereignty over international airspace, effectively functioning as national airspace. From Turkey鈥檚 perspective, the problem does not lie in Greece鈥檚 provision of air traffic services, but in the way FIR procedures are used as 鈥渄efence perimeter鈥� in disputed areas of the Aegean Sea. Although both States consistently frame this dispute in terms of FIR responsibility, the underlying logic of defence, identification, and interception resembles that of ADIZ practices. This reflects a broader ambiguity, as ADIZ regimes are established unilaterally and are not governed by comprehensive international rules.
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A closely related pattern can be seen in the Nicosia FIR dispute. Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus has continued to provide air traffic services for the Nicosia FIR under ICAO arrangements. However, and its authority to manage the FIR, which has resulted in . ICAO has consistently treated the Nicosia FIR as a functional arrangement without prejudice to sovereignty in line with the Chicago Convention. Nevertheless, Turkey鈥檚 position illustrates how FIR management can become entangled with questions of legitimacy and unresolved territorial disputes and sovereignty.
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Additionally, FIRs are also used as symbols of 鈥渘ational pride鈥� and support arguments of states鈥� political narrative. Somaliland鈥檚 position illustrates an explicit politicization of FIR control. It openly claims that responsibility for the and extends this claim to airspace, aerodromes, and navigation systems. A similar, though less explicit, use of nationality鈥慴ased rhetoric appeared in Indonesia鈥檚 public justification for reclaiming the Natuna airspace, especially by the military, which relied heavily on appeals to and .
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IV. When Control is on the Forefront
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When the FIR's responsibility becomes more about asserting unilateral control than ensuring the capability of States to conduct the function, the safety鈥慴ased foundation of the Chicago Convention system begins to weaken over time. This shift towards asserting unilateral control also undermines the spirit of cooperation that ICAO depends on. Pilots and passengers may be exposed to avoidable risks, not because of intentional misconduct, but because political sensitivities have made information鈥憇haring or joint planning more constrained than it should be.
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For example, in the , the dispute between over FIR responsibilities has been linked to and heightened operational risks for civil aviation. Similar safety concerns have arisen in the context of the Nicosia FIR. Although the Republic of Cyprus continues to provide air traffic services under ICAO arrangements, Turkey unilaterally established an and refused to engage with the Nicosia FIR authorities. ERCAN is not recognized by ICAO, but still intervenes with the Nicosia FIR and issues uncoordinated ATC clearances that result in irregular coordination, particularly with military flights. This lack of cooperation increases the risk of miscommunication and undermines the safety of air navigation.
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Although the Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Cyprus disputes both involve resistance to FIR practices that are politically loaded, they differ in character. The Aegean dispute concerns the alleged use of FIR procedures to reinforce contested sovereignty claims between Turkey and Greece; whereas the Nicosia FIR dispute is rooted primarily in issues of political recognition of Cyprus. In both cases, however, FIR responsibility as designed under the Chicago Convention to be purely operational becomes entangled with broader political questions.
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In Somalia, the federal government has invoked its internationally recognized authority over the Mogadishu FIR and warned that unauthorized instructions issued by pose a serious threat to aviation safety. Reports indicate that aircraft have, at times, received from competing authorities, creating real and immediate operational .
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For Indonesia, through years of national campaign on the basis of national territory, the agreement of FIR alignment with Singapore was finally concluded in 2022. However, despite the transfer of responsibility to Jakarta FIR, the agreement retained the long鈥憈erm delegation, allowing Singapore to. This outcome raises as to whether the emphasis on FIR control was driven, at least in part, by political and symbolic considerations rather than immediate operational necessity, given the continued reliance on Singapore for service provision.
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These examples illustrate how disputes over FIR control, when driven by political or sovereignty鈥憆elated considerations or undertones, can undermine coordinated air traffic services and pose tangible risks to aviation safety. It can also reduce cross鈥慴order cooperation and create unnecessary friction in areas where communication is critical. The more FIR responsibility is treated as a political asset, the more difficult it becomes to maintain ICAO鈥檚 standards of uniformity and safety.
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V. It鈥檚 Time to Talk About Safety
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Sovereignty rhetoric is a powerful and effective selling point for politicians, especially now when national interests have become more heightened compared to international cooperation in international politics. It is emotionally appealing, widely understood, and effective in generating public support and sympathy. But it has almost nothing to do with the actual purpose of FIR responsibilities. Operational safety depends on technical capability and coordination, not political rhetoric.
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If a State granted FIR responsibility has the technical capacity, institutional readiness and willingness to cooperate to fulfil the role properly, then there will be no concern to object. However, when political prestige overshadows international aviation objectives and safety standards, civil aviation faces unnecessary risk. This is why it is essential to reassert that FIR alignments are safety-centric. This system functions only when States entrusted with responsibility uphold high service standards and maintain open coordination among neighbours.
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Ultimately, FIRs are meant to facilitate safe and orderly navigation and not to serve as vessels for national prestige, territorial expansion or political discourse. For an industry that connects the world, cooperation among States in ensuring aviation safety is not merely desirable but essential. Only then can this framework function as intended: as a connected system across jurisdictions to ensure aviation safety.
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Abraham Manggala Pardede is an LLM Student at the Institute of Air and Space Law, 涩里番.
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In keeping with 涩里番鈥檚 commitment to academic freedom, the Institute of Air and Space Law supports the free expression of ideas in its publications. The views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Institute of Air and Space Law, the Faculty of Law, or 涩里番. Furthermore, authors represent only themselves; they do not represent their countries of nationality nor any organizations with which they may be affiliated.