涩里番

Evolutionary conflict in viruses: the theoretical implications and natural abundance of viral public goods cheats

Asher Leeks, University of British Columbia
Tuesday February 10, 12-1pm
Zoom Link:听
In Person: 550 Sherbrooke, Room 189

Abstract: Viral infections are social processes. To successfully replicate inside infected cells, viruses must produce shared gene products, that can be used by multiple viral genomes within the same cell, and hence act as public goods. As a result, viral cheats can emerge, a type of molecular parasite formed by large deletions, which spread by exploiting public goods encoded by full-length viruses. Cheats exist across the viral universe, arise frequently in laboratory infections, and reflect the emergence of evolutionary conflict at the molecular level.

I will start by exploring the evolutionary consequences of cheats for viral infections, including their potential to drive viral populations extinct over short timescales, or to drive the emergence of new forms of genome organisation over longer timescales. I will then present our recent work identifying and quantifying cheats in natural viral infections, leveraging thousands of newly available avian influenza sequencing datasets. We have found that in more than one in three animal infections, viral cheats exceed 50% of the viral population, indicating that they are the majority variant within that population. I will discuss the implications of this widespread cheat abundance in natural infections, including potential clinical consequences and applications within public health surveillance.